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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal requires us to apply the Truth in Lending 
Act's assignee liability provisions in light of contract 
language required by regulatory fiat and to determine the 
parameters of assignee liability under the TILA. Asserting a 
violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.S 1601 et 
seq., plaintiff alleges she was harmed by deceptive lending 
practices of a dealer from whom she purchased an 
automobile. Plaintiff seeks to recover against Hyundai 
Motor Finance Co., the assignee of her finance agreement, 
rather than against the automobile dealer. Three Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have encountered nearly identical TILA 
claims and all have concluded plaintiffs could not state a 
claim.1 Following those courts, the District Court granted 
Hyundai's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over a district court's order dismissing a 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Port 
Authority v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 
1999); Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1397-98 (3d 
Cir. 1997). In conducting our review, we must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Green v. Levis Motors, Inc., 179 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 1999); Ellis v. 
GMAC, 160 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 1998); Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc., 
150 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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       determine if plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any 
       reasonable reading of the pleadings, assuming the 
       truth of all the factual allegations in the complaint. . . . 
       A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that 
       no relief could be granted under any set of facts that 
       could be proven consistent with the allegations. 
 
Alexander, 114 F.3d at 1398 (citations omitted). 
 
II. 
 
As noted by the District Court, the facts in this case are 
uncomplicated.2 Ramadan purchased a used Hyundai for 
$4,238.50 from automobile dealer Bob Ciasulli, Inc. 3 
Plaintiff also purchased an extended warranty contract for 
$998.00. Because she purchased on credit, the sale was 
achieved through a Retail Installment Contract ("RIC").4 
Hyundai provided the RIC form to the dealer. 
Contemporaneous with its execution, the RIC was assigned 
to Hyundai Motor Finance Corp. 
 
At the time the RIC was assigned to Hyundai, other loan 
documents were also transmitted, among them an 
accounting of payments made under the RIC, which 
plaintiff alleges "reveal the true cost of the warranty, the 
actual amount paid to the issuer and the payment of the 
undisclosed finder's fee." Compl. at P29. Plaintiff also 
alleges Hyundai "issue[d] the checks or credits in payment 
for the warranty and in payment for the commission or 
finder's fee." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This is the second time this case has been before this court. The first 
time, we determined the TILA statute of limitations provision was subject 
to equitable tolling. See Ramadan v. The Chase Manhattan Corp., 156 
F.3d 499, 504 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
3. Plaintiff is attempting to bring suit on her own behalf and on behalf 
of those similarly situated. See Compl. atP1. The District Court made no 
determination with respect to the class action aspects of this case. 
 
4. Plaintiff signed three different RICs in connection with the sale. See 
Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 973 F. Supp. 456, 457 (D.N.J. 
1997). Despite semantic differences, all three are alleged to have 
contained the same TILA violating provision. See id. For the sake of 
clarity, we will treat this as if plaintiff signed one RIC containing the 
alleged misrepresentation, which was then assigned to Hyundai. 
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The RIC contained a provision which itemized "Other 
Charges Including Amounts Paid to Others on Your Behalf " 
and stated $998.00 had been paid for a service contract. 
Ramadan alleges an undisclosed amount of that figure was 
retained by the dealer without her knowledge in violation of 
the TILA. Given the nature of review of a motion made 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we must accept plaintiff 's 
assertion as true. 
 
Central to this case are two provisions--TILA's assignee 
liability rule and a Holder Notice required by Federal Trade 
Commission regulations. The TILA section which governs 
assignee liability provides: 
 
       Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, any 
       civil action for a violation of this subchapter . . . which 
       may be brought against a creditor may be maintained 
       against any assignee of such creditor only if the 
       violation for which such action or proceeding is 
       brought is apparent on the face of the disclosure 
       statement, except where the assignment was 
       involuntary. For the purposes of this section, a 
       violation apparent on the face of the disclosure 
       statement includes, but is not limited to (1) a 
       disclosure which can be determined to be incomplete 
       or inaccurate from the face of the disclosure statement 
       or other documents assigned, or (2) a disclosure which 
       does not use the terms required to be used by this 
       subchapter. 
 
15 U.S.C. S1641(a) (emphasis added). In accord with FTC 
rules, see 16 C.F.R. S433.2(a) (1997), the RIC also 
contained a Holder Notice, which stated: 
 
       NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT 
       CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND 
       DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT 
       AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
       OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE 
       PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY 
       THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID 
       BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER. 
 
The proper understanding of these two provisions lies at 
the heart of this case. Holding the TILA assignee liability 
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provision rather than the Holder Notice governed the 
action, the District Court held plaintiff could not state a 
claim under 15 U.S.C. S1641(a) because there was no 
"violation apparent on the face of the disclosure document." 
See Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., No. 96-3791, slip 
op. at 6-8 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 1999). Lacking guidance from our 
circuit, the District Court adopted the views of the three 
United States Courts of Appeal that have addressed similar 
claims. The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Eleventh 
and Fifth Circuits have all concluded in situations similar 
to those presented here that an assignee could not be held 
liable under the TILA. See Green, 179 F.3d at 286; Ellis, 
160 F.3d at 703; Taylor, 150 F.3d at 689. 5 
 
III. 
 
Ramadan contends S 1641(a) encompasses her claim that 
the TILA violation here was apparent on the face of the 
disclosure statement as that concept is statutorily defined. 
She also asserts Hyundai is liable because it expressly 
assumed assignee liability by including the Holder Notice 
clause in the RIC. 
 
A. 
 
As noted, the TILA imposes assignee liability only if a 
violation is "apparent on the face of the disclosure 
statement." Section 1641(a) further explains:"a violation 
apparent on the face of the disclosure statement includes, 
but is not limited to (1) a disclosure which can be 
determined to be incomplete or inaccurate from the face of 
the disclosure statement or other documents assigned, or 
(2) a disclosure which does not use the terms required to be 
used by this subchapter." 15 U.S.C. S1641(a). Ramadan 
never alleged the TILA violation was apparent on the face of 
the RIC. She contends her assertion that "[t]he inaccuracies 
and misrepresentations regarding the extended warranty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Taylor and Ellis courts faced practically identical facts. See 
Taylor, 
150 F.3d at 691-92; Ellis, 160 F.3d at 705. The deception alleged in 
Green concerned hidden charges for state licensing fees. See Green, 179 
F.3d at 288. 
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disclosures are obvious . . . on the face of the installment 
sales contract or from other related documents . . .," Compl. 
at P29 (emphasis added), nevertheless suffices to state a 
claim. We cannot agree. Even the statute's "but is not 
limited to" or "other documents assigned" language does 
not permit such an expansive interpretation of what 
provides adequate assignee notice to trigger TILA liability. 
 
The disclosure statement assigned to Hyundai was not 
transmitted in a vacuum, but together with "related loan 
documents, including the accounting of distributions made 
pursuant to the contract." Ramadan contends those 
documents should be considered to determine whether a 
violation was apparent on the face of the disclosure 
statement because TILA is a remedial statute which should 
be construed broadly. See Ramadan, 156 F.3d at 502 
("TILA is a remedial statute and should be construed 
liberally in favor of the consumer."); Smith v. Fidelity 
Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1988) 
("TILA, as a remedial statute which is designed to balance 
the scales `thought to be weighed in favor of lenders,' is to 
be liberally construed in favor of borrowers." (citations 
omitted)). 
 
The flaw in that argument is apparent in Ramadan's 
restatement of her claim: 
 
       Here, plaintiff alleges that the violation is apparent on 
       the face of the disclosure statement because the 
       disclosure can be determined to be incomplete or 
       inaccurate from the face of the disclosure statement or 
       other documents assigned or transmitted together with 
       the disclosure statement. 
 
Appellant's Reply Br. at 5 (emphasis altered from original). 
The "or transmitted" clause in Ramadan's restatement is a 
significant alteration of the statutory language. Section 
1641(a) recites "other documents assigned," not "other 
documents transferred" or "other documents." If the other 
document is "not assigned" it does not fall under the 
statutory definition. A document transferred but not 
assigned cannot qualify even under a liberal construction of 
the statute. Cf. Green, 179 F.3d at 295 (rejecting plaintiff 's 
argument that violation was apparent because information 
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on RIC conflicted with publicly available information 
because "[t]he only `assigned' document that the [plaintiffs] 
point to is the RIC"). 
 
Resort to the "but is not limited to" language in S 1641(a) 
is similarly unavailing. As noted, our sister circuits have 
uniformly held that "apparent on the face" means exactly 
that--for an assignee to be liable under TILA, the violation 
must be apparent on the face of the assigned disclosure 
documents. We agree. 
 
In Taylor, for example, plaintiff asserted the violation at 
issue was "apparent on the face" because the lender, given 
its experience in the field, must have known that a violation 
had occurred. See Taylor, 150 F.3d at 694 (noting 
plaintiff 's allegation "the apparentness (or lack thereof) of a 
violation should be ascertained in light of the knowledge 
that a reasonable assignee similarly situated to the 
defendants should have"). The Taylor Court rejected that 
argument because "the rule for which the plaintiffs are 
arguing would impose a duty of inquiry on financial 
institutions that serve as assignees." Id.  The Taylor Court 
correctly held that S 1641(a) creates no such duty and that 
"[o]nly violations that a reasonable person can spot on the 
face of the disclosure statement or other assigned 
documents will make the assignee liable under the TILA." 
Id. 
 
Avoiding the imposition of a duty of inquiry on lenders is 
not the sole justification proffered by our sister circuits in 
rejecting claims similar to those made here. In fact, 
Ramadan's allegations are nearly identical to those rejected 
in Ellis. As the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit explained: 
 
       The Ellises argue that since GMAC issued the checks 
       and credits to [the extended warranty provider] in 
       payment for the warranty and that related loan 
       documents reveal the true cost of the warranty as well 
       as the amount paid to the parties, the discrepancy 
       between the amount supposedly paid to [the extended 
       warranty provider] and the amount actually paid by 
       GMAC reflected a violation on the face of the 
       documents. 
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160 F.3d at 709. The Ellis Court rejected this argument 
because it required the court to "resort to evidence or 
documents extraneous to the disclosure statement" and 
"[t]his the plain language of [S1641(a)] forbids us to do." Id. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
closely followed Taylor and Ellis when it concluded that it 
could look at "assigned documents" and only"assigned 
documents" to determine liability under S 1641(a). See 
Green, 179 F.3d at 295. In Green, plaintiff argued the 
additional information assignee needed to determine the 
existence of a TILA violation was publically available in the 
form of state licencing fee tables. The court rejected that 
argument because "[a]lthough Louisiana's fee tables may be 
available to the public, those tables do not constitute, 
according to S 1641(a)'s text, `documents assigned' " to the 
assignee. Id. 
 
Ramadan admits the documents crucial to Hyundai's 
ability to determine the existence of a TILA violation were 
not assigned to Hyundai. But, as in Ellis and Green, 
plaintiff here urges that "apparent on the face of the 
disclosure statement" encompasses TILA violations other 
than those that can be determined from looking at the 
assigned disclosure statement. As the Green, Ellis and 
Taylor courts have explained, looking beyond the 
documents assigned to determine whether a violation was 
"apparent on the face of the disclosure statement" is 
inconsistent with S 1641(a). See also Elwin J. Griffith, Truth 
in Lending--Recission, Consumer Remedies and Creditor 
Defenses in Closed-end Transactions, 19 U. Tol. L. Rev. 
491, 538 (1988) ("The rationale for this protection is that 
the assignee should not be saddled with violations that are 
not readily detectable."). 
 
That Congress meant to exclude resort to outside 
documents in defining assignee liability under TILA is clear 
both from the changes Congress made in its 1980 
amendments to S 1641(a) and from the subsequent addition 
of a related subsection. 
 
Prior to the 1980 amendments, S 1641 provided: 
 
       [I]n any action or proceeding by or against any 
       subsequent assignee of the original creditor without 
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       knowledge to the contrary by the assignee when he 
       acquires the obligation, written acknowledgment of 
       receipt by a person to whom a statement is required to 
       be given pursuant to this subchapter shall be 
       conclusive proof of delivery thereof and, unless the 
       violation is apparent on the face of the statement, of 
       compliance with this part. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1641 (1979). In amending S 1641, Congress 
removed the "without knowledge" language from the section 
dealing with assignee liability although it left similar 
language in another subsection of 1641.6  See 15 U.S.C. 
S 1641(b). The removal demonstrates Congress intended 
actual knowledge independent of what could be discerned 
from the disclosure statement to be insufficient to trigger 
assignee liability under S 1641(a). 
 
As noted, Ramadan alleges the TILA violation here was 
apparent on the face of the disclosure statement because 
 
       Hyundai issue[d] the checks or credits in payment for 
       the warranty and in payment for the commission or 
       finder's fee and thus ha[d] actual knowledge of the 
       falsity of the representation in the contract. . . . 
 
Compl. at P29. Although counsel for plaintiff conceded at 
oral argument that liability "can't be [triggered by] 
knowledge," her argument indicated an attempt to draw a 
distinction between constructive knowledge, which she 
contended would be insufficient, and actual knowledge, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. As noted, S 1641(a) currently provides: 
 
       Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, any civil action 
for 
       a violation of this subchapter . . . which may be brought against a 
       creditor may be maintained against any assignee of such creditor 
       only if the violation for which such action or proceeding is 
brought 
       is apparent on the face of the disclosure statement, except where 
       the assignment was involuntary. For the purposes of this section, a 
       violation apparent on the face of the disclosure statement 
includes, 
       but is not limited to (1) a disclosure which can be determined to 
be 
       incomplete or inaccurate from the face of the disclosure statement 
       or other documents assigned, or (2) a disclosure which does not use 
       the terms required to be used by this subchapter. 
 
15 U.S.C. 1641(a). 
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which she asserted was sufficient to support assignee 
liability. There is nothing in the history or text of S 1641(a) 
to support such a differentiation. 
 
That the allegations here fail to state a claim under 
S 1641(a) is also apparent from a comparison of that section 
with one of its companion subsections. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 1641(e). Section 1641(e) creates assignee liability for TILA 
violations in transactions secured by real property. As in 
S 1641(a), assignee liability is triggered by violations 
"apparent on the face of the disclosure statement provided 
in connection with such transaction . . . ." Id. But S 1641(e) 
provides a different definition of "apparent on the face": 
 
        For the purpose of this section, a violation is 
       apparent on the face of the disclosure statement if-- 
 
        (A) the disclosure can be determined to be 
       incomplete or inaccurate by a comparison among the 
       disclosure statement, any itemization of the amount 
       financed, the note, or any other disclosure of 
       disbursement. . . . 
 
Id. Although S 1641(e) was adopted 15 years after S 1641(a), 
it demonstrates Congress knows how to adopt a different 
formulation of "apparent on the face" if it desires. In this 
case of alleged assignee liability in a consumer credit 
transaction not involving real property as security, it has 
not done so. 
 
As noted by the Taylor court, Congress "narrowed 
considerably the potential scope of assignee liability," by 
enacting the current version of S 1641(a). Taylor, 150 F.3d 
at 693. Plaintiff 's interpretation of S 1641(a) runs counter 
to Congress's considered judgment. 
 
A narrowing of assignee liability is consistent with the 
overarching reasons put forth by Congress for amending 
the TILA in 1980. Explaining the purpose behind the 
amendments, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs noted that "many creditors have 
sincerely tried to comply with the act but, due to its 
increasing complexity and frequent changes, have 
nonetheless found themselves in violation and subject to 
litigation." S. Rep. 96-73, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
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236, 281. For that reason, among others, Congress 
amended TILA to "mak[e] compliance easier for creditors 
[and] limit[ ] creditor civil liability for statutory penalties to 
only significant violations . . . ." Id.  The reading of S 1641(a) 
applied by our sister circuits conforms with Congress's 
intent to simplify compliance by creditors and limit liability 
while offering protection to consumers against illegal 
lending practices. 
 
Congress's narrowing of assignee liability is also 
consistent with the other changes Congress made to the 
TILA in 1980. Before the 1980 amendments, dealers and 
lenders were both treated as "creditors" subject to 
consumer suits. See 15 U.S.C. S 1602(f) (1976). See also 
Elwin J. Griffith, supra, at 538. Post-1980, there is a clear 
divide between the liability of "creditors," defined as "the 
person to whom the debt . . . is initially payable," 15 U.S.C. 
S 1602(f) (1982), and assignees. This change was made to 
"eliminate confusion under the [pre-1980] act as to the 
responsibilities of assignees and `arrangers of credit.' " S. 
Rep. 96-368 at 24, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 
259. Plaintiff 's interpretation of S1641(a) would undo the 
distinction drawn by Congress. 
 
B. 
 
Ramadan also contends the District Court erred in 
granting Hyundai's motion to dismiss because of Hyundai's 
express assumption of assignee liability. As noted, the FTC- 
required Holder Notice included in the RIC provides for 
assignee liability with regard to "all claims and defenses 
which the debtor could assert against the seller . .. ." In 
light of this provision, plaintiff asserts the RIC should be 
enforced as written. 
 
The same argument has been made to, and rejected by, 
other courts that have examined assignee liability under 
TILA. See, e.g., Green, 179 F.3d at 296; Ellis, 160 F.3d at 
709; Taylor, 150 F.3d at 693. The Taylor  Court noted that, 
by FTC regulation, the RIC must contain the Holder Notice. 
See Taylor, 150 F.3d at 692 (citing 16 C.F.R.S433.2). 
Because of that requirement, the Taylor Court concluded 
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       The Holder Notice, even though contained within the 
       contract, was not the subject of bargaining between the 
       parties, and indeed could not have been. It is part of 
       the contract by force of law, and it must be read in 
       light of other laws that modify its reach. 
 
Id. at 693. In the opinion of the Taylor  Court, S 1641(a) 
"limited one set of claims [the Holder Notice] may carry 
through to the assignee . . . ." Id. The Eleventh Circuit 
similarly concluded the Holder Notice language "required by 
the FTC regulation standing alone does not suffice to 
subject [assignee] to liability." Ellis , 160 F.3d at 709. The 
notice could not have such an effect because inclusion of 
required language did not result from "bargaining or 
agreement by the parties to reflect [ ] a voluntary and 
intentional assumption of liability." Id. In fact, every federal 
court that has considered the Holder Notice argument since 
the Taylor decision, including the District Court here, 
followed Taylor's reasoning and concluded inclusion of the 
Holder Notice cannot trump the assignee liability rules in 
S 1641(a). 
 
Plaintiff challenges the soundness of the Taylor , Ellis and 
Green decisions and contests whether Hyundai's inclusion 
of the Holder Notice was truly involuntary. According to 
plaintiff, Hyundai could have carved out an exception to 
TILA liability in the Holder Notice. Given that option, 
Ramadan asserts inclusion of the unaltered Holder Notice 
reflects Hyundai's intent to assume greater liability than 
that created by S 1641(a). 
 
That argument misses the point. The FTC rule requiring 
the Holder Notice is explicit regarding its inclusion: 
 
       In connection with any sale or lease of goods or 
       services to consumers . . . it is an unfair or deceptive 
       act or practice . . . for a seller, directly or indirectly, to: 
 
       (a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which 
       fails to contain the [Holder Notice] provision in at least 
       ten point, bold face type. . . . 
 
16 C.F.R. S433.2. By its terms, the FTC regulation is 
mandatory; it does not contemplate deviations or 
modifications. Because regulations cannot trump statutory 
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mandates, the FTC mandated language must be understood 
in light of any statutory limitations. 
 
Plaintiff also takes issue with the involuntariness 
argument central to the Taylor-Ellis analysis contending it 
is inconsistent with the standard of review on a motion to 
dismiss. There is, however, no allegation the Holder Notice 
was included voluntarily by Hyundai. In fact, plaintiff 's 
complaint recognizes the Holder Notice was included in the 
RIC in compliance with 16 C.F.R. S422.3. See  Compl. at 
P41. Given the regulatory requirement, it is reasonable to 
assume the Holder Notice was not voluntarily included and 
therefore does not manifest Hyundai's intent to contract 
around S 1641(a). 
 
Ramadan argues that whether or not our sister circuits 
are correct, this case is governed by Ballay v. Legg Mason 
Wood Walker, Inc., 878 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1989), 7 which she 
asserts stands for the proposition that courts should 
enforce the clear language of a contract and not look 
beyond the contract language to the regulatory background. 
See id. at 734. 
 
Ballay concerned an agreement between parties to a 
brokerage contract that provided for arbitration of all 
claims except those arising from "federal securities laws." 
Id. at 731. Investors brought suit asserting a number of 
violations, including violations of the Securities Act of 1933. 
See id. at 730. The District Court denied defendant's 
motion to compel arbitration on all claims including those 
arising under "federal securities laws." Id. At the time the 
agreement was signed, parties could not agree in advance 
to arbitrate Securities Act claims. As a result, SEC rules 
required that arbitration clauses, if made part of an 
agreement, include a provision noting that Securities Act 
claims could not be arbitrated. Subsequent to execution of 
the agreement, the SEC rescinded its rule and during the 
pendency of the case, the Supreme Court decided securities 
claims could be arbitrated. See id. at 734. Defendant, Legg 
Mason, argued that because of the SEC rule in effect at the 
time of execution, the exception was not bargained for and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The District Court distinguished Ballay . See Ramadan, No. 96-3791, 
slip op. at 8 n.7. 
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thus should not be binding. The Court concluded that it 
could not look beyond the language of the contract, holding 
the defendant should have challenged the rule if it did not 
want to be bound by it or at least it should have 
renegotiated the arbitration exception after the repeal of the 
governing SEC rule. See id. 
 
Ramadan asserts the language in the RIC "admits of no 
justification for looking beyond it to the regulatory history 
surrounding its inclusion." Id. As with Legg Mason, she 
contends Hyundai "cannot now win relief from the specific 
language of its own contract simply because it claims not to 
have meant what it said." Id. 
 
Despite some similarities, there are stark differences 
between this case and Ballay. Ballay did not involve the 
interplay of federal regulations and statutory provisions. 
The contract provision in question in Ballay was consistent 
both with the underlying legal framework at the time it was 
agreed upon and at the time it was enforced. Inclusion of 
the provision exempting securities claims from arbitration 
was consonant with SEC regulations at the time the 
contract was executed. See id. Although arbitration of 
disputes had been judicially accepted and the SEC 
regulation had been rescinded by the time Ballay  was 
decided, arbitration was not compulsory. See id.  at 733 
("Although the Federal Arbitration Act establishes a 
presumption in favor of arbitrability when arbitrability is in 
doubt, it does not prevent parties from agreeing to exclude 
matters from arbitration if they so desire."). Therefore, the 
exclusion provision at issue in Ballay was not contradicted 
by the statutory or regulatory background. 
 
That is not the case here. The Holder Notice language 
included in the RIC is far more expansive than TILA's 
assignee liability language. Indeed, there is a clear 
irreconcilable conflict between the two provisions. The 
Ballay Court faced no such conflict. 
 
The Ballay Court also addressed the presumption of 
voluntariness in a way that distinguishes it from this case. 
As noted, the regulation in Ballay requiring the arbitration 
exception language was no longer in effect at the time of the 
case. The Ballay Court observed defendant had ample 
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opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the arbitration 
clause and chose not to, thereby undermining its 
involuntariness argument. See id. at 734. Here, both the 
FTC Holder Notice regulation and S 1641(a) have been in 
effect at all relevant times. Hyundai has not had the same 
opportunity to negotiate in a changed regulatory 
environment as did Legg Mason in Ballay. Absent such an 
opportunity, inclusion of the Holder Notice in the RIC 
cannot be seen as voluntary in the way the continued 
presence of the arbitration exception language in the broker 
contract was seen as voluntary in Ballay. 
 
Ramadan also relies on a Florida state court decision, 
Boden v. Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 396 So.2d 827 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Relying on an exception to a 
Florida statute governing assignee liability in home 
installment contracts which exempted savings and loans 
from such liability, the trial court in Boden  held the 
defendant could not be liable for a breach of an assigned 
home installment contract. See id. at 829. The trial court 
reached that conclusion even though the assigned home 
installment contract contained a "Holder Notice" provision. 
See id. at 828. The Florida appellate court concluded the 
savings and loan association could agree to assignee 
liability even though it was exempted from such under state 
law and that it "voluntarily subject[ed] itself to liability by 
the terms of the home improvement contract." Id. at 829. 
Plaintiff has offered no reason, other than the Boden court's 
adoption of a mode of analysis more sympathetic to its 
position than that adopted by our sister circuits, as to why 
we should follow the Florida District Court of Appeals. Of 
course, Boden did not involve the interplay of federal 
statutory law and regulatory requirements and the conflict 
between the two. 
 
In short, neither our decision in Ballay nor Boden 
compels a different result from that reached by the District 
Court here. The FTC-required Holder Notice cannot trump 
the TILA's assignee liability mandates. 
 
As the dissent notes, parties to a contract may"waive 
statutory protections and assume liabilities not required by 
law." Ellis, 160 at 709. But like the court in Ellis, we believe 
the defendant has not done so here. There is no allegation 
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or evidence that Hyundai waived its statutory rights or 
agreed to assume liability beyond that set forth in 
S 1641(a). Hyundai's failure to include with the Holder 
Notice a warning or disclaimer does not constitute the type 
of intentional relinquishment necessary to give rise to a 
waiver of statutory rights. Without some evidence the 
parties bargained for and Hyundai waived its statutory 
rights, there is no basis to impose waiver or estoppel. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's judgment dismissing plaintiff 's complaint under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
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POLLAK, District Judge, dissenting. 
 
I agree with the court's conclusion, in Part III(A) of its 
opinion, that the case at bar is not one in which the alleged 
violation of the TILA "is apparent on the face of the 
disclosure statement" and hence could have been the basis 
for Ms. Ramadan's suit "against [Hyundai Motor Finance 
(hereinafter "Hyundai") as] assignee of[a] creditor." 15 
U.S.C. S 1641(a). But I disagree with the court's conclusion, 
in Part III(B) of its opinion, that the language of the Holder 
Notice, which was contained in Ms. Ramadan's automobile 
finance agreement and which advised Ms. Ramadan that 
"ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT 
IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS . . . WHICH THE DEBTOR 
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER," did not provide a 
basis for Ms. Ramadan's suit against Hyundai. 
 
As I understand the court's opinion, its determination 
that the Holder Notice is nugatory is the product of the 
following syllogism: (1) The Holder Notice appeared in Ms. 
Ramadan's finance agreement (and, one must suppose, 
hundreds of thousands of other finance agreements) not as 
a provision voluntarily acquiesced in by the seller and the 
assignee finance company, but in compliance with a 
regulation of the Federal Trade Commission making it"an 
unfair and deceptive trade act or practice . . . for a seller, 
directly or indirectly, to . . . [t]ake or receive a consumer 
credit contract which fails to contain the [Holder Notice] 
provision. . . ." 16 C.F.R. S 433.2. (2) In determining the 
scope of civil liability for violations of the TILA, Congress 
has limited the liability of an assignee of a finance 
agreement to violations "apparent on the face of the 
disclosure statement, except where the assignment was 
involuntary." 15 U.S.C. S 1641(a). (3) Since the Holder 
Notice's inclusion in the Ramadan finance agreement was, 
in the court's view, coerced by the FTC; and since the 
Holder Notice, as prescribed by the FTC regulation, is in the 
court's view, in "irreconcilable conflict" with the TILA; and 
since "regulations cannot trump statutory mandates," the 
Holder Notice must give way. 
 
The syllogism has, unquestionably, a straightforward 
simplicity which makes it quite compelling. The difficulty 
with the syllogism is that its focus is confined to the 
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respective interests of Congress, the FTC, and Hyundai. Ms. 
Ramadan is, it appears, outside the terms of debate. But it 
is the Ramadans of the world to whom the Holder Notice is 
addressed. It is the Ramadans of the world who can be 
taken to have relied on what the Hyundais of the world 
have, by accepting assignment of finance agreements, said 
to them. Granted that Congress has authority to negate the 
FTC directive that the Holder Notice be incorporated in 
every "consumer credit contract." That appears to be what 
Congress meant to do when, in 1980, it amended TILA in 
a fashion that substantially narrowed the assignee liability 
that the FTC had established by regulation several years 
before. But if, after 1980, a finance company continued to 
accept (or, if new to the financial marketplace, commenced 
accepting) finance agreements which contained the Holder 
Notice, why--as between the finance company and the 
purchaser-borrower--shouldn't the finance company be 
held to the representation of holder liability contained in 
the finance agreement? 
 
The court's answer, so it would appear, is that the Holder 
Notice was never bargained for--that in its inception it was 
placed in finance agreements by virtue of FTC ukase. And 
presumably the court is also of the view that it is the 
enduring in terroremness of the FTC's authority that 
accounts for the continuing presence of the Holder Notice 
in finance agreements entered into (and sometimes litigated 
about) a decade, or even two decades, after Congress 
amended the TILA and, by hypothesis, exercised its 
authority to deflate the FTC regulation. I will not argue 
(although I think the argument could plausibly be made) 
that by now the Holder Notices that remain in place are 
there because finance companies, well aware that Congress 
in 1980 relieved them of any administratively mandated 
liability, have decided to accept liability as a contractual 
matter. To the contrary, I am prepared to accept, arguendo, 
that the Holder Notice remains an unbargained-for 
ingredient of the standard finance agreement. But it seems 
to me that a finance company, feeling that the Holder 
Notice is in place via force majeure and intending to defend 
against its applicability in any litigation that may arise, 
should, before accepting assignment of a finance 
agreement, insist that the Holder Notice be garlanded with 
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caveat emptors that warn the purchaser-borrower of the 
finance company's view that the 1980 TILA amendment 
robs the Holder Notice of substantive effect. Afinance 
company has no ground for supposing that more than one 
in tens of thousands of purchaser-borrowers (the 
Ramadans of the world) will be conversant with the 
interplay between the FTC regulation and TILA. Given the 
disparity in the possession of crucial information, I would 
conclude that an assignee finance company that failed to 
insist on inclusion of an appropriate warning adjacent to 
the Holder Notice should be estopped from invoking the 
Holder Notice in litigation. 
 
Requiring an assignee finance company that wishes to 
protect against TILA liability to add the type of warning 
described above would avoid the difficulty of frustrating a 
purchaser-borrower's expectations. It would also avoid the 
consequences the court appears to be concerned about. 
Finance companies would no longer have grounds for 
feeling that they were being pushed by the FTC to give up 
rights guaranteed by Congress. Finance companies would 
have the choice to construct a contract that assigned TILA 
liability or to construct a contract that did not do so. 
Purchaser-borrowers' reasonable expectations, andfinance 
companies' freedom to avoid assignee liability (as they are 
entitled to do under 15 U.S.C. S 1641(a)), would thus be 
preserved. 
 
This approach is possible because the conflict between 
the statutory and regulatory provisions is not, as the court 
states, "irreconcilable." As was recognized in Ellis v. General 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 
1998), "[i]t is certainly true that parties can waive statutory 
protections and assume liabilities not required by law." And 
while Hyundai is required by the FTC to include the Holder 
Notice as written, the FTC regulation does not prohibit 
additional language preserving the finance companies' 
rights under 15 U.S.C. S 1641(a). Nor could the FTC 
prohibit the inclusion of such language, for the very reason 
that animates the court's opinion: the FTC's regulations 
cannot trump congressional statutes. 
 
Such an approach would, so it seems to me, be in 
harmony with this court's approach to the cognate problem 
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presented in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 878 
F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1989). In today's opinion the court says 
that, "[d]espite some similarities, there are stark differences 
between this case and Ballay." I find the differences far less 
stark than the court does. And I find compelling the 
wisdom animating Judge Rosenn's opinion for the Ballay 
court: 
 
       [W]e conclude that the unequivocal exclusionary 
       language in plaintiffs' arbitration agreements creates a 
       contractual right to litigate plaintiffs' Securities Act 
       claims. The language admits of no justification for 
       looking beyond it to the regulatory history surrounding 
       its inclusion. In any event, even if we were to look at 
       the regulatory background we see no reason in it for 
       rejecting customers' reasonable expectations. A 
       customer reading the exclusionary language could not 
       be expected to be aware of the regulatory background 
       or to understand that the language may become 
       meaningless with the winds of change in the law. 
 
878 F.2d at 734. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
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